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EVIDENCE OF POST-ACCIDENT FAILURES, MODIFICATIONS
AND DESIGN CHANGES IN PRODUCTS
LIABILITY LITIGATION
DON L. DAVIS*

The expanding field of products liability litigation has produced
many exciting and challenging issues with the adoption of the concept
of strict liability in tort as promulgated in the Restatement Second of
Torts, Sections 402A and 402B. 1 One of the most interesting, and
most misunderstood, questions created by this revolution in litigation
is under what circumstances or conditions, and for what purpose, is evidence admissible of post-accident failures of the same or similar
products, and post-accident modifications or changes in design which
tend to eliminate a previously existing condition associated with a
product or its use. This -type of evidence in the trial of a major case
based upon strict liability in tort is obviously significant to the trial bar.
Anytime that a manufacturer designs, assembles and places on the
market a mass produced product, all of which must conform to a specified quality, evidence that other of these products failed in the same
manner as the product causing the plaintiff's injury is highly indicative
that the product was in fact defective at the time it was manufactured.
The fact that some of the products fail after the plaintiff is injured
should not affect the admissibility of the incident in strict liability cases
if it is in fact a substantially similar occurrence. With the adoption of
the concept of strict liability in tort, none of the policy reasons which
existed in common law negligence cases for excluding evidence of subsequent occurrences have merit. Whether a failure, modification, or
design change occurs before or after the incident involved in the suit,
evidence of such events involving the same product is both relevant and
material in determining if the product in question was in fact defective.
* Partner in the firm of Byrd, Davis, Eisenberg & Clark, Austin, Texas; B.S.,
Abilene Christian College, 1962; L.L.B., University of Texas, 1965; Briefing Attorney
for the Supreme Court of Texas, 1965-66.
1. Adopted in McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787, 789 (Tex. 1967)
and Shamrock Fuel & Oil Sales Co. v. Tunks, 416 S.W.2d 779, 783 (Tex. 1967).
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POST-ACCIDENT MODIFICATION
APPLICATION IN NEGLIGENCE CASES

Disregarding considerations of causation, in the usual common law
negligence products case the thrust of the evidence is directed toward
establishing that the defendant knew, or in the exercise of ordinary care
should have known, that a dangerous or defective condition existed.
Two elements must be established-first, that the product is in fact
dangerous or defective, and second, that the defendant had notice of
this dangerous or defective condition.
It is this second requirement, that the defendant either had actual
knowledge of a dangerous or defective condition or, in the exercise of
ordinary care should have known of a dangerous or defective condition,
that does not exist in strict liability cases. Because it is essential to establish this knowledge in. negligence cases, a rule has developed that evidence of other accidents involving the same condition, the "same inanimate cause ' 2 or the use of the "same instrumentality ' 3 is admissible as
probative evidence tending to establish that a condition or instrumentality is dangerous and that the defendant had notice of the condition.4
The reason for this is because "the frequency of accidents at a particular place would seem to be good evidence of its dangerous charac5
ter."
There is, however, a caveat to this rule: a predicate must first be
laid to show that other accidents have occurred under "substantially
similar" conditions. 6 Each case turns upon the particular facts involved, and no hard and fast rule exists for determining when other
accidents occur under "substantially similar" conditions. The admissibility of the evidence, then, depends solely upon whether or not the
other accidents are so similar as to be of probative value and does not
7
turn upon identity of circumstances.
2. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Bozeman, 394 S.W.2d 532, 538 (Tex. Civ.- App.-Tyler

1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
3.

Brockman v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 115 S.W.2d 753, 755 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galves-

ton 1938), affd, 134 Tex.451, 135 S.W.2d 698 (1940).

4. Beaumont, S.L. & W.R. v. Richmond, 78 S.W.2d 232, 236 (Tex. Civ. App.-

Beaumont 1935, writ dism'd). See generally II C. MCCORMICK & R. RAY, TEXAS LAW
OF EVIDENCE §. 1525 (2d ed. 1956).
. - 5. Beaumont, S.L. & W.R. v. Richmond, 78 S.W.2d 232, 236 (Tex. Civ.
App.Beaumont 1935, writ dism'd).
6. For an extensive discussion of the rule and its applicability under varying circircumstances see Annots., 70 A.L.R.2d 170 (1960); 128 A.L.R. 595 (1940); 127 A.L.R.
1194 (1940); 81 A.L.R. 685 (1932); 65 A.L.R. 380 (1930).
7. M.K.T. Ry. v. McFerrin, 279 S.W.2d 410, 418 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1955).
rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 156 Tex. 69, 291 S.W.2d 931 (Tex. 1956), includes an excellent discussion of just what constitutes "substantially similar" circum-
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The probative value of similar accidents which occur before the
plaintiffs accident is obvious. However, since a tortfeasor cannot be
held responsible in a negligence action for either actual knowledge or
constructive knowledge of a dangerous condition or instrumentality
which he receives after the plaintiff's accident, most jurisdictions exclude evidence of post-accident similar occurrences and restrict the evidence to those accidents which occurred before the plaintiff was
injured. 8 The basis for this rule of exclusion in negligence cases is the
fear that evidence of post-accident occurrences would confuse the jury
or unfairly prejudice the jury against the defendant.
Even in negligence cases the probative value of post-accident occurrences cannot be denied when weighed on the issue of whether or not
a condition or instrumentality is in fact dangerous or hazardous.' Such
evidence should not be excluded on the grounds that the jury will be
unable to focus on the purpose for its being admitted, and the evidence
should be admitted with a proper instruction to the jury not to give it
consideration in determining whether or not the defendant had notice
of the condition.
By the same token, evidence of post-accident modifications or design
changes is generally inadmissible in common law negligence cases.
Two reasons are generally given for this exclusion. First, post-accident
changes do not necessarily infer prior negligence "for repairs or improvements merely indicate a belief that the object repaired has been
capable of causing the injury."' 0 Second, a policy argument is
advanced that to allow such evidence would discourage post-accident
improvements and safety precautions." There are, however, exceptions to this rule. In negligence cases evidence of post-accident modifications and design changes is admissible to rebut testimony that the
product could not be improved, 12 that a different design was not
stances where the court noted, "[w]e believe that the jury was fully capable of evaluating these minor variations in conditions and that their existence was not of sufficient
substance to require exclusion of this testimony." Id. at 418; see Otis Elevator Co. v.
Robinson, 287 F.2d 62, 65 (5th Cir. 1961); City of Wichita Falls v. Crummer, 71 S.W.
2d 583, 585 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1934, writ dism'd); City of Dallas v. McCullough, 95 S.W. 1121, 1124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1906, writ ref'd).
8. See, for example, Texas Power & Light Co. v. Bristow, 213 S.W. 702, 706 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1919, writ ref'd); 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 458, at 472-73 (3d ed. 1940).
9. 1 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 12.01(4) (1971).
10. Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 321 F.2d 683, 690 (5th Cir.
1963).
11. Regardless of the antecedents of this policy, it is no longer valid in today's sophisticated world of insurance coverage by product manufacturers.
12. Winnsboro Cotton Oil Co. v. Carson, 185 S.W. 1002, 1007 (Tex. Civ. App.Dallas 1916, no writ).
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feasible or practical,

3

have been avoided.'

6

to establish control, 14 to show conditions which

existed at the time of an accident, 15 or to show that the accident could

Neither the rules of exclusion in negligence

cases nor the exceptions which have been developed have any applica-

tion in products liability cases based on strict liability in tort, since
knowledge plays no part in attaching liability.
STRICT LIABILITY IN TORT

It is no part of the doctrine of strict liability that the manufacturer
of the product has "knowledge" or "notice" of a defective condition
or that he be in a position to "discover" the defect by the exercise of
ordinary care. Yet, the fear that a defendant will be prejudiced by
evidence of the "notice" received in post-accident failures in negligence
cases is one of the bases for excluding such evidence in negligence
actions. This concept is wholly inapplicable where liability is grounded
upon proof that the product was defective which renders it unreasonably dangerous to the user. Under Section 402A of the Restatement
Second of Torts, liability is imposed without fault and attaches even

though "the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product"'17 and "does not turn on the producer's knowledge
or lack of knowledge of unfitness of the product.""'

Accordingly, in

strict liability cases it is necessary to demonstrate only that the product
was defective for its intended use at the time it was manufactured, and
this fact can be established by circumstantial evidence when such fact

is fairly and reasonably inferable from other facts proved in the case. 19
13. Boeing Aircraft Co. v. Brown, 291 F.2d 310, 315 (9th Cir. 1961); Johnson v.
United States, 270 F.2d 488, 492 (9th Cir. 1959); Houston Lighting & Power Co. v.
Brooks, 319 S.W.2d 427, 436 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1958), rev'd on other grounds,
162 Tex. 32, 336 S.W.2d 603 (1960).
14. Houston Lighting & Power Co. v. Taber, 221 S.W.2d 339, 344 (Tex. Civ. App.
-- Galveston 1949, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
15. Steele v. Wiedemann Mach. Co., 280 F.2d 380, 382 (3d Cir. 1960); Rash v.
Ross, 371 S.W.2d 109, 114 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1963, writ ref'd n.r.e.); City
of Beaumont v. Dougherty, 298 S.W. 631, 636 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1927), affld,
9 S.W.2d 1030 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1928, jdgmt adopted).
16. Jennings v. United States, 207 F. Supp. 143, 148 (D. Md. 1962), aff'd, 318 F.2d
718 (4th Cir. 1963). See also C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 275(g), at 66667 (2d ed. 1972); Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 1296, 1315 (1959).
17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
18. Hoover v. O.M. Franklin Serum Co., 444 S.W.2d 596, 598 (Tex. 1969).
19. Franks v. National Dairy Prod. Corp., 414 F.2d 682, 686 (5th Cir. 1969). As
stated in Pittsburg Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Ponder, 443 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. 1969),
"[t]his is not to say that proof of the defect must be made by direct or opinion evidence; it usually can only be made by circumstantial evidence." Id. at 548 (emphasis
added).
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Post-Accident Failures
In the area of liability without fault it is obvious that evidence of substantially similar product failures which happen both before and after
the incident causing the plaintiff's injury are equally probative that the
product was in fact defective. The only limitation in this regard is that
they must be "substantially similar" failures.2 0 In Woiciechowski v.
Long-Airdox Division of Marmon Group, Inc.,2" suit was brought
against a manufacturer to recover for injuries sustained when a
compressed air blasting shell misfired. In considering the admissibility
of evidence that other shells had misfired, the court noted that each
of the shells was of "identical design with the suspect shell" and that
evidence of other misfiring was admissible as "direct evidence that the
suspect shell was itself defective. ' 22
Similarly, in Ginnis v. Mapes Hotel Corp.,23 a hotel guest was
injured when an automatic door closed on her. The court said "evidence of subsequent, similar accidents involving the same door are
relevant to causation and a defective and dangerous condition under
that theory."2 4 It thus admitted evidence of both prior and subsequent
accidents.
In Penn v. Inferno Manufacturing Corp.,2 5 plaintiff was injured when
a "site glass" used on a high pressure instrument exploded. Although
it was apparently not at issue, the court reviewed evidence that after
the site glass exploded which injured the plaintiff, it was replaced with
a second site glass which also exploded. Commenting upon the weight
of this evidence, the court stated that it "lends further inference that
coming glass had not exercised the degree of care required of them
26
in the manufacture of their product.
Evidence of post-accident failures of other products in strict liability
cases is admissible not only because it is direct, relevant and probative
evidence that a product conforming to the identical design was defective, but also on the issue of causation to show "that the injury was
20. 1 HURST, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABLIrY § 1:9 (1961).
21. 488 F.2d 1111 (3d Cir. 1973).
22. Id. at 1116; see Lolie v. Ohio Brass Co., 502 F.2d 741, 746 (7th Cir. 1974).
23. 470 P.2d 135 (Nev. 1970).
24. Id. at 139. The trial court had also excluded evidence of 16 repair orders on
repairs both before and after the accident. In passing on whether these repair orders
should be admissible under strict liability, the court said: "Should the repair orders,
prior or subsequent, tend to prove the faulty design or manufacture or any other necessary element of that cause of action, they would be admissible." Id. at 140.
25. 199 So. 2d 210 (La. Ct. App.), aftrd, 222 So. 2d 649 (La. 1967).
26. Id. at 228.
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caused by the condition." 7 Such evidence was recognized in Wojciechowski as a prime vehicle through which to counter a manufacturer's
contention that the design of the product was such that it was impossible for the product to fail because of the defect alleged by plaintiff.
One court has admitted evidence of other complaints received by the
manufacturer from persons adversely affected by the use of its product.
Recognizing that such facts could become material evidence of the issue of causation, the New Hampshire Supreme Court noted that the
existence of other complaints "may well be material and competent upon the question of whether harm was probably caused by an ingredient
of the product, rather than as the result of abnormal susceptibility on
the part of the complainant."'2 8 The court also indicated that such evidence might also touch upon the issue of notice of an inherently
dangerous product, and the accompanying duty to warn.2"
Post-AccidentModifications and Design Changes

After a product is sold, and defects in design come to the manufacturer's attention, the manufacturer has a duty to remedy these defects,80
or, if complete remedy is not feasible, "at least to give users adequate
warnings and instructions concerning methods for minimizing the
danger."'" Certainly the initial failure to give adequate warnings concerning the use of a product will render the product unreasonably
dangerous, a situation in which strict liability can attach. 2 The basis
for this is that the manufacturer alone is in "apeculiarly strategic position to improve the safety of his products, so that the pressure of strict
liability could scarcely be exerted at a better point if accident prevention is to be furthered by tort law."'as As a result, manufacturers are
held to the degree of knowledge and skill of experts which imposes
27. Ginnis v. Mapes Hotel Corp., 470 P.2d 135, 139 (Nev. 1970).
28. Farnum v. Bristol-Meyers Co., 219 A.2d 277, 279 (N.H. 1966).
29. Id. at 279; see Badorek v. General Motors Corp., 90 Cal. Rptr. 305 (Ct. App.
1970).
30. See, for example, Nader & Page, Automobile Design and the Judicial Process,
55 CAL. L. REv. 645 (1967) where the authors state that
the manufacturer's highest objective should be based on a fundamental principle of
safety engineering: to anticipate every type of accident which may result from machine or human failure and then to minimize both the risk of failure and the injuries which may be sustained when failure occurs.
Id. at 652.
31. Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 411 F.2d 451, 453 (2d Cir.
1969).
32. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1089 (5th Cir. 1973).
33. James, General Products--Should Manufacturers Be Liable Without Negligence?, 24 TENN. L. REV. 923 (1957). See also James, Products Liability, 34 TEXAs
L. REV. 44 (1955).
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expert status upon the manufacturer.8 4 He must be aware of the
developments in his field "including safety devices and equipment used
in his industry with the type of products he manufactures.""5 As one
court has stated "the manufacturer is required to adopt any and all
devices the absence of which render his product unreasonably dangerous.""0 The result is that evidence of competitive and comparative
designs has uniformly been held admissible, either from expert witnesses knowledgeable about the particular industry3 7 or knowledgeable
about the specific uses to be made of the product. 8
In strict liability cases evidence of post-accident modifications and
design changes of the manufacture should be admissible as probative
evidence that the original design of the product was defective. At the
very least, modifications and design changes fully qualify as an admission when tested under traditional rules of evidence.39 Moreover, the
policy basis for excluding such evidence in negligence cases does not
exist in strict liability cases where liability is imposed even though "the
seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product. ' 40 In today's world of competitive, consumer-oriented manufacturers, it is unreasonable to suggest that admission of such evidence
would discourage manufacturers from taking safety precautions and
making post-accident improvements. In fact, in addition to humanitarian reasons, there are at least two compelling practical reasons why
manufacturers are likely to take immediate safety precautions upon
learning of existing defects. First, manufacturers realize that liability
insurance companies will not continue to insure the further production of known defective products; as a condition to continuing the
34. Dunham v. Vaughn & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 229 N.E.2d 684, 688 (111. Ct. App.
1967), a/I'd, 247 N.E.2d 401 (Ill. 1969).
35. Moren v. Samuel M. Langston Co., 237 N.E.2d 759, 765 (I11.
Ct. App. 1968);
see Noel v. United Aircraft Corp., 342 F.2d 232, 236 (3d Cir. 1964) (concerning a man-

ufacturer's "continuing duty").
36. Rivera v. Rockford Mach. & Tool Co., 274 N.E.2d 828, 833 (Ill. Ct. App.
1971), quoted with approval in Mahoney v. Roper-Wright Mfg. Co., 490 F.2d 229, 233

(7th Cir. 1973).

In Noel, Manufacturer's Negligence of Design or Directions for Use

of a Product, 71 YALE L.J. 816, 826 (1962), the author states:

It would seem that where a safety device can be easily attached and will remedy

a real danger, there should be a duty to take reasonable steps to supply the safety

device even to those to whom the product already has been sold. There is no doubt
that such a duty exists when it develops that the original design is clearly defective.
37. Blohm v. Cardwell Mfg. Co., 380 F.2d 341, 344 (10th Cir. 1967).
38. See Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 85 Cal. Rptr. 629, 632-33, 633 n.2 (1970);
McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 154 N.W.2d 488 (Minn. 1967).
39. Any action taken by a party or on a party's behalf which is inconsistent with
a position being taken by that party during trial qualifies as an admission.
40.

RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
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existing insurance coverage the manufacturer would be required by
the liability insurance company to correct these defects. Second, manufacturers are well aware of the marketing impact which adverse
publicity can have on future sales; and future sales will definitely take
high priority over the payment by a manufacturer's insurance carrier
of a damage suit judgment. The experience of the automotive industry
is illustrative. In order to comply with statutory mandate, car manufacturers were required to send "recall letters" notifying purchasers of
safety related defects.'
Certainly, this is clear evidence that safety
precautions and improvements will not in any way be retarded by considerations of tort law.4" As the doctrine of strict liability expands,
courts are recognizing that evidence of post-accident modification and
design changes are important factors to be considered by the fact
finder.
In Hoppe v. Midwest Conveyor Co. 4 3 the trial court refused to admit

much of the plaintiff's expert testimony concerning the alleged defective design of the machinery in question. The circuit court admitted
the testimony and listed the criteria it would consider in determining
the relevancy of post-accident modifications. Defective design could
be proved relevant by
(1) the comparative design with similar and competitive machinery in the field;
(2) alternative designs and post accident modification of the
machine;
(3) the frequency or infrequency of use of the same product with
or without mishap; and
44
(4) the relative cost and feasibility in adopting other designs.
In a wrongful death action brought against the manufacturer of an
allegedly defective strip-mining machine evidence of a post-accident
modification in the design of the equipment was admissible. 45 In
acknowledging the admissibility of alternate designs,"4 the court concluded:
41. 15 U.S.C. § 1402(a) (1970).
42. See Nevels v. Ford Motor Co., 439 F.2d 251, 258 (5th Cir. 1971); Glynn Plymouth, Inc. v. Davis, 170 S.E.2d 848, 850-51 (Ga. Ct. App. 1969), af'd, 173 S.E.2d
691 (Ga. 1970).
43. 485 F.2d 1196 (8th Cir. 1973).
44. Id. at 1202.
45. Sutkowski v. Universal Marion Corp., 281 N.E.2d 749, 752 (111. Ct. App. 1972).
46. In the development of products liability principles design alternatives are appropriately considered whether reasonable care is the basis of liability or where liability is
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If the feasibility of alternative designs may be shown by the
opinions of experts or by the existence of safety devices on other
products or in the design thereof . . . evidence of a post occur-

rence change is equally relevant and material in determining that
a design alternative is feasible.47
In Wallner v. Kitchens of Sara Lee4 8 the design of a conveyor belt
was questioned. Post-accident photographs which revealed design
changes that were effected after the incident in question were admitted
into evidence at the trial. Approving the admission of the evidence,
the court discounted the policy basis for excluding this type of evidence
in negligence cases and concluded that "[e]vidence of post-accident
repairs or changes is properly introduced for any purpose except to
'49
demonstrate the negligence of a defendant.
In Brown v. Quick Mix Co.50 a guard rail was welded on the

machinery involved immediately following an accident. The evidence
was admitted to show the feasibility of guarding the centralizer. The
basis for this ruling was that since the issue of "feasibility" was in the
case, evidence of subsequent changes in the design of the machinery
would be admissible regardless of whether it was the plaintiff or the
defendant who injected the issue into the case. This same rule was
applied in Stark v. Allis Chalmers & Northwest Roads, Inc.,5 1 and in
Boeing Airplane Co. v. Brown.5 2 In the latter case the manufacturer

was willing to admit that changes in the product "would have been
'
The
feasible before the accident and were in fact made afterwards."58
manufacturer would not admit, however, to the exact changes that were
made after the accident. The trial court admitted evidence of those
specific changes since Boeing refused to admit the feasibility of the
"specific" changes which it made.
predicated upon strict tort liability. Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 85 Cal. Rptr. 629,
633 (1970). Inboth cases it appears that policy considerations are involved which shift
the emphasis from the defendant manufacturer's conduct to the character of the product.
Such change and emphasis furnishes additional reasons for permitting evidence of alternative designs in a strict tort liability case. See Moore v. Jewel Tea Co., 253 N.E.2d
636, 646 (III. Ct. App. 1969).
Ct. App. 1972).
47. Sutkowski v. Universal Marion Corp., 281 N.E.2d 749, 753 (Ill.
48. 419 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1969).
49. The court also discusses admissibility of standards of the American Safety
Standards Institute as being "relevant to the questions of the dangerousness of the conveyor." Id. at 1032.
50. 454 P.2d 205, 209 (Wash. 1969).
51. 467 P.2d 854 (Wash. Ct. App. 1970).
52. 291 F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1961); see Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 85 Cal. Rptr.
629 (1970); cf. Ault v. International Harvester Co., 110 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1973).
53. Boeing Airplane Co, v. Brown, 291 F.2d 10, 315 (9th Cir. 1961).
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The Ninth Circuit affirmed, opining that
an admission that unspecified "changes" would have been feasible
and were actually made does not render irrelevant evidence as to
specific changes subsequent to the accident when offered for the
limited purpose of proving the 54feasibility of such changes to correct the specific defects in issue.
One other aspect of the case is noteworthy. Boeing objected because some of the design changes which were introduced into evidence
were unrelated and had no causal connection with the accident. The
appellate court rejected Boeing's contention that these should not have
been admitted. It concluded that "the fact that the trial court
ultimately placed primary blame on defects in the design of the speed
controls and the protective shroud . . . would not make irrelevant
prior inquiries into other alleged defects in the '[mechanism]. 5
In Ellis v. H.S. Finke, Inc., 56 the essence of the plaintiff's complaint
was that a hoist was defectively designed. The basis for this claim was
that subsequent to the sale of the hoist "an improved safety device"
was perfected, and that without this device previously sold hoists were
defective. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed a
directed verdict for the manufacturer because there was no causal connection between "the falling of the platform and the failure to install
the new safety device." However, the case clearly recognizes that evidence of post-sale modifications in design is admissible evidence.
CONCLUSION

For several decades courts have wrestled in common law negligence
cases with the rule that evidence of post-accident failures, modifications
and design changes are inadmissible. As a result, various exceptions
have developed which have allowed this evidence to be admitted under
various circumstances and for limited purposes. 57 With the adoption
of the concept of strict liability in tort, none of the rationale and policy
bases for excluding evidence of post-accident failures, modifications
and design changes exist. Such evidence is clearly probative, relevant
and material in determining if a similar product was unreasonably
dangerous for its intended use.
54. Id. at 315.
55. Id. at 316.
56. 278 F.2d 54 (6th Cir. 1960).
57. An extensive list of cases applying these exceptions will be found in 1 L. PUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRoDvucTs LLIwI§ 12.04, at 337-38 (1971).
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